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separating them. We now expect exacting documentation and historical sensitiv- 
ity. A good story is not enough, although the present book will inspire some to 
nostalgia for the bad old days. (Perhaps the editors had second thoughts about 
wanting to be compared with Bell, for the running head changes title toward the 
end.) 
Naturally, there is another difference with Bell’s book: the raison d’&re of this 
new one resides in women. Yet, even when dealing with the fundamental question 
of sexism in career trajectories, the book remains true to its erratic pattern. For 
example, Kendall’s problems with advancement are attributed to sexism, al- 
though it is doubtful that a man with a similar curriculum vitae would have ad- 
vanced faster. At the same time, Rudin’s exclusion from a professorship because 
of nepotism rules must be inferred from the dates given for her advancement from 
lecturer to professor. As a consequence, it is difficult to draw any conclusions 
regarding gender and mathematics from this collection. 
Indeed, perhaps it is too much to expect a Biobibliographic Sourcebook to 
provide conclusions. Is it not sufficient that the book provide data and inspire 
questions? However, the higher goal is what the editors set for themselves. A 
foreword by Alice Schafer, the preface by the editors, and an introduction by 
Jeanne LaDuke, all stress that the purpose of this book is to provide inspiration 
and insight for new generations of women mathematicians. That ambitious expec- 
tation is sadly unfulfilled; when read from cover to cover, the book is painfully 
dull. 
And yet, if judged against the lesser goal, the book is quite good. The demo- 
graphic data provide a starting point for analysis, and though the remaining bio- 
graphical data sometimes contain lacunae, the sources are frequently there to fill 
in the holes. Indeed, the greatest strength of the book is its bibliography, particu- 
larly since many entries are annotated. It provides quick access to a wealth of 
material, some of it difficult to trace, especially foreign references. A researcher 
dealing with topics that involve the modern mathematical community will find the 
book invaluable. In sum, Women of Mathematics succeeds as a Sourcebook but 
fails as inspiring biography. 
Cantorian Set Theory and Limitation of Size. By Michael Hallett. Foreword by M. 
Dummett. Oxford Logic Guides: 10. Oxford/New York (Clarendon Press- 
Oxford Univ. Press). 1984. xxii + 343 pp. $25.00. 
Reviewed by Gabriele Lolli 
Dipartimento di Informatica Universitci degli Studi di Torino 10149 Torino, Italy 
This book is a peculiar mixture of historical and philosophical analyses, both 
scholarly and thoroughly pursued; precisely because of its high standards, it also 
offers a good opportunity to reflect on a methodological issue, namely, whether 
historical and philosophical analyses can or should be intermixed. Contrary to 
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Hallett’s intentions, here, in the reviewer’s opinion, the two types of analyses 
tend to affect one another negatively. 
The aim of Hallett’s work is to present “an integrated account of both Cantor’s 
metaphysical and mathematical theories of infinity” (p. x), taking the philosophy 
seriously (which is seldom done) in order to answer such questions as: What was 
Cantor’s own conception of sets? What effect did Cantor’s philosophical and 
foundational ideas have on the shape of his own theory and on what came later? 
The book is, accordingly, divided into two parts. The first part deals with Cantor’s 
work and covers his conception of infinity, the theory of infinite cardinal numbers, 
the notion of number, and the origin of the limitation-of-size criterion. The second 
part tries to clarify “how far the main axiomatizations of set theory, at first sight 
so different from Cantor’s approach, used or absorbed [his] principles” (p. 195). 
The first part of the book consists of a detailed and meticulous reading of both 
the published papers and the letters from Cantor’s NuchZuss in Gottingen. Hallett 
has performed here a very useful service, presenting a lively picture, not just a 
summary. It is a pleasure to be shown the twisted paths in the growth of a new 
theory: the uncertainties, the difficulties, the refinements, and the changes of 
mind. Proofs are discussed in detail when relevant in illustrating a general point, 
or the presence of some in nuce element (e.g., implicit use of well-ordering 
[p. 76]), or a shift of strategy. 
Certain later work and side developments are also brought to the attention of 
the reader. Some of this comes into the story as a natural extension of Cantor’s 
own problems, e.g., the debate on the dispensability of ordinals (pp. 89-98); other 
aspects look marginal, and continue to look so after Hallett’s effort to bring them 
into the picture, as is the case of Mirimanoff s original work (pp. 185-194). Topics 
like Martin’s contemporary work on the projective hierarchy or Reinhardt’s justifi- 
cation of large cardinals through reflection principles (pp. 1 lo- 118) are perhaps of 
dubious historical relevance. These recent developments are discussed as if they 
had a direct bearing on Cantor’s understanding. In any case the treatment is 
always competent and the subjects show the author’s scholarly mastery. 
There is only one disturbing flaw, which it is a pity to have to warn of, repre- 
sented by Hallett’s inferences. From the assumption that Cantor’s metaphysical 
views “contributed enormously to the shape and development of the key Canto- 
rian concepts,” the author jumps to the unwarranted conclusion “that therefore 
there is a direct route from Cantor’s metaphysics to the substance and nature of 
modern set theory” (p. x). His analysis does not support this claim, and plain 
reiteration will not do. We are told repeatedly that “it is important at this point to 
say something about the metaphysical background to this theory” (p. 62) on the 
same page where we are informed in Cantor’s own words of the mathematical 
aims and difficulties that shaped his development (similarly on p. 6). 
Hallett’s own beautiful initial account of the series of papers from 1872 to 1883 
shows how the basic problems were all laid open in the mathematical work, before 
the first recorded discussion of the transfinite and the Absolute, in 1883. He 
admits (p. 3) that the continuum problem was central since 1878, and he is not able 
to explain why this was so on the basis of metaphysical considerations. 
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Of course, Cantor was facing a foundational problem, but it is too easy and 
misleading to describe it as the philosophical clarification of the set concept. 
Granted Cantor’s Platonistic outlook, his foundational problem was nevertheless 
that of mathematically justifying the concept of set and explicating what “mathe- 
matical justification” could possibly mean in this context. A whole generation of 
mathematicians during the late 19th century found themselves in a similar predica- 
ment with regard to the existence of mathematical entities. So we see Cantor 
proposing different criteria, alternately stressing conceptual clarity, some sort of 
coherence, the constructivism of a divine mind, formalist guarantees, and reason- 
ing by analogy. We follow his struggle from a constructive subjective mode of 
expression toward an objective foundation, a struggle that emerges from Hallett’s 
articulate guidance through the maze of Cantor’s writings. 
One should not overcharacterize as definite positions what were undecided 
tentative experiments. Unfortunately, Hallett tries to force Cantor’s views to the 
point that they become a positive reductionist position, namely, the thesis that 
numbers are sets. Yet Hallett’s own exposition reveals Cantor’s preference for an 
Aristotelian notion of numbers based on collections; it is also clear that Cantor’s 
discussion of abstraction-how we arrive at numbers from sets-is hopelessly 
inadequate. Frege’s criticism of Cantor’s idea of putting together several identical 
“ones” is dutifully recorded (pp. 121-123); but to substitute a full-fledged reduc- 
tionist explanation for this, Hallett must call “obscure and admittedly confused” 
one of Cantor’s few clear-cut statements, a passage where Cantor openly says that 
numbers are not sets (though based on sets) but objective representations in our 
inner intuition (p. 53). 
Hallett tries to axiomatize Cantor’s philosophy into a few basic assumptions, 
from which everything mathematical follows. Foremost among these is a principle 
Hallett unhappily calls “finitism”: the principle that the transfinite is to be treated 
so far as possible like the finite. If this meant only that transfinite sets are on a par 
with the finite sets insofar as their mathematical status is concerned (p. 39), or the 
basic property of admitting a cardinal number (“the most important heuristic 
application of the finitism principle” [p. 40]), then it could not be questioned. But 
not much more should be charged to the principle; still, there is often loose talk 
here about the similarity between transfinite and finite sets “in their fundamental 
properties” (p. 156). 
Another basic principle is the distinction between the Absolute, which cannot 
be mathematically determined, and the transfinite, which is the infinite capable of 
being increased and hence numbered. This principle certainly played a role in 
Cantor’s work, perhaps an even deeper one than Hallett intimates. Hallett sees in 
it the source of what came to be known as the limitation-of-size principle, a 
principle that, however, was cast in a mathematical form by Cantor only in 1899, 
in the statement that a collection is a set if and only if it has no subcollection 
equivalent to the sequence of ordinal numbers. In Hallett’s account, the interval 
between the first mention of the Absolute and its appearance in 1899 seems too 
long. The gap can be filled thanks to recent work by Walter Purkert, who has 
convincingly shown that Cantor already knew in the early 1880s that the totality of 
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all ordinals and the totality of all alephs are nonconsistent sets. The distinction 
between the transfinite and the Absolute was first mentioned by Cantor when he 
became aware of this difficulty; it was the way in which he reassured himself of 
the harmless character of these (later so-called) antinomies. 
The limitation-of-size principle leads to the second part of the book, after the 
examination in chapter 4 of the difficulties encountered by Jourdain and Russell in 
dealing with such an idea in a nonaxiomatic setting. Hallett starts by investigating 
whether “limitation of size considerations [did] at least guide the selection of 
central axioms” (p. 197). In this pursuit he plunges into the history of Zermelo’s 
and von Neumann’s axiomatizations and presents a good deal of interesting and 
little-known material. He argues that Zermelo distilled his axioms from his own 
proof of the well-ordering theorem to counterbalance criticism leveled against the 
1904 proof (though Zermelo himself indicated that all of set theory, as historically 
given, was the source of the axioms). Hallett explains Zermelo’s unwillingness to 
include a theory of numbers in his theory of sets, but he also illustrates Zermelo’s 
unpublished attempt to develop the theory of ordinals. Hallett also gives some 
information on the history of the replacement axiom, from the first unconvincing 
and inadequate formulations of Fraenkel to von Neumann’s final clarification. 
In the end, Hallett can show that the limitation-of-size principle does not pro- 
vide “a complete plausible explanation of the axioms” of axiomatic set theory (p. 
197). Contrasted with the often cursorily repeated claims to the contrary, by 
commentators of the stature of Bernays, Weyl, Quine, and Levy (see p. 198), this 
is a welcome reminder; as perhaps only Levy seems aware, the smallness of the 
power set needs an independent justification, one whose roots we find in the long 
experience with the basic structures of the reals and of real functions. 
Hallett concludes by asserting the philosophical failure of the limitation-of-size 
principle. Such a conclusion was highly predictable, from the point of view of 
Hallett, who seems to want to tell us that Cantor’s heritage became lost through 
philosophical impoverishment: limitation of size was assumed as a simpleminded 
justification, and it does not work. But then axiomatic set theory is a kind of 
conceptual cripple, or so we are likely to believe if we repeat the platitude that 
axiomatization “went hand in hand with the divorce from any attempt to under- 
stand what sets are or what conceptual role they play” (p. 303), a remark on which 
the book unfortunately ends. 
The history of the axiomatization of set theory in the 1920s is certainly not that 
of an answer to the philosophical challenge of building limitation of size into the 
axioms. It is a much more complex story, connected with the development of the 
axiomatic method. All kinds of unexpected problems came to light with the axi- 
omatization of set theory: Skolem began by pointing out the relativism of set 
theoretical notions in different models, a disturbing phenomenon when categoric- 
ity was pursued either through the Beschriinktheitsaxiom or though the dual ax- 
iom of completeness. The axiomatization referred to models through the ambigu- 
ous notion of Bereich, not too different from “set.” There was the Definitheit 
notion, and there was impredicativity, so crucial to the distinction between 
Fraenkel’s and von Neumann’s understanding of replacement. The replacement 
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axiom began in Fraenkel as a closure axiom more than as a limitation-of-size 
principle; impredicativity was also involved in von Neumann’s treatment of the 
minimal model problem (impredicativity is mentioned in the book [pp. 236-2391 in 
the course of an interesting, but very long and out-of-place, discussion of Kant’s 
antinomies [pp. 223-2391). 
The many-faceted history of logic and set theory in the 192Os, far from being a 
failure, is finally beginning to be brought to light and appreciated; now is not the 
time for overly simplified accounts or judgments. 
Islamic Mathematical Astronomy. By D. A. King. Collected Studies Series, CS 
23 1. London (Variorum Reprints). 1986. 342 pp. 
Reviewed by Sonja Brentjes 
Bereich Medizin , Karl-Sudhoff-Institut der Karl-Marx-UniversitHt, 
German Democratic Republic 
7010 Leipzig, 
This volume reproduces 16 papers and two reviews written by the author 
between 1973 and 1983. Their originals appeared in various journals and in the 
proceedings of two symposia, not all of which belong to the standard sources of a 
historian of science, even one who deals with the Islamic medieval age. Nearly all 
of the chosen papers expand our knowledge of the history of Islamic astronomy 
and mathematics as well as of its material basis. The main subjects covered are the 
mathematical concepts and methods underlying astronomical tables often unex- 
plained by their authors (trigonometric formulas, graphical solutions, and auxil- 
iary means) and some of the standard problems of Islamic astronomy (determina- 
tion of prayer times and of the qibla, the direction of Mecca). 
King presents a good deal of new material, mainly tables, which have never 
been studied before, and a sound survey of the mathematical methods involved. 
Perhaps the most important new results are those concerning the tables of Ibn 
Yiinus (d. 1009, Cairo), especially his so-called “very useful tables” for reckoning 
time by the sun and regulating the astronomically defined times of Muslim prayer, 
as well as those of al-Khalili (fl. ca. 1350, Damascus). The latter pursued the 
tradition laid down by Ibn Yunus and added three trigonometric functions as 
auxiliary tools for solving all problems for any latitude instead of for only one 
fixed latitude, as in the earlier tables. Other papers are devoted to areas and 
historical periods (Yemen, Ottoman Turkey, and the Mamluks), which have hith- 
erto remained largely outside historical explorations. 
The incorporation of two reviews of books by S. H. Nasr and A. al-Daffa, 
however, does not suit this volume’s character, although the reviewer shares the 
judgments therein expressed. Both books are of little value to the historiography 
of Islamic science. It would have been preferable instead to have republished any 
of King’s other studies. 
Altogether, the reproduced papers present a colorful picture of some major 
topics in Islamic astronomy from the 9th to the 20th century. 
